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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the effect of disproportional ownership structure on 
corporate performance with an explicit control for earnings management. Specifically, 
we use accrual-adjusted performance instead of raw performance following Cornett et 
al. (2008). In particular, we explore the effect of separation in control and ownership 
of China’s family-controlled or individual-controlled listed firms on earnings 
management and test whether the measured importance of ownership variables is 
increased when true performance is used. This is an issue not hitherto examined by 
prior studies conducted in countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom where the ownership structure is dispersed and the conflicting interests of 
shareholders and managers are a major agency problem. 
In many countries, especially Asian countries in the world, where concentrated 
ownership is prevalent, agency problems mainly arise from the agency conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Extant literature (e.g., 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) has investigated that ownership structure can significantly 
influence both corporate performance and earnings management. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) argue that controlling shareholders are likely to appropriate firm resources as 
control-cash flow rights difference increases. In other words, conflicting interests 
among shareholders might lower firm performance. 
Recent research measures the agency problems by the divergence between the 
ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and control rights. Ever since then, their 
methodology of agency problems measurement has been used extensively. For 
example, Classens et al. (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) use this methodology to 
examine the impact of agency problems on firm value in emerging economies. They 
conclude that in general, the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ cash 
flow rights and control rights has negative and significant impact on firm value, 
measuring in Tobin’s q and stock market returns. However, it is not obvious whether 
the separation of control rights from cash flow rights affects operating performance. 
For example, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2009) show that disproportional ownership 
structures reduce firm value but do not affect firm performance and hence argue that 
disproportional ownership does not lead to less efficiently used corporate resources 
from European large firms. 
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Furthermore, Lemmon and Lins (2003) pointed out that ownership structure plays a 
key role in determining the expropriation on minority shareholders, which is also 
related with earnings management activities. That is, when controlling shareholders’ 
disproportional ownership affects both firm performance and earnings management, 
the true effects of ownership structure on firm performance after adjusting the impact 
of earnings management might change as well. For example, the research of Black 
(2001), Black et al. (2002), Gompers et al. (2003) shows a significant effect of 
corporate governance variables on firm performance. Cornett et al. (2008) point out 
that the impact of corporate governance on firm performance changes when the true 
firm performance is measured. Cornett et al. (2008) further argue that if both earnings 
management and corporate performance are likewise impacted by governance 
mechanisms then the influence of these governance mechanisms on reported firm 
performance is probably partly cosmetic. 
These studies on ownership structure share one common feature. They all regress 
Tobin’s q or market-to-book ratio as proxies for firm value or firm performance on 
measures of the separation between control and cash flow rights. However, these 
studies fail to properly identify true firm performance which is adjusted for the effects 
of earnings management.  
China has become the second-largest economy in the world following US in 2006 
based on purchasing power parity (PPP) (CIA, 2007). In terms of the report from the 
Economist (2008), China’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 11.4% on 
average at yearly base to 24.66 trillion yuans (or approximately 3.43 trillion US 
dollars) in 2007.  China, a large and emerging economy with a specific institutional 
background, now provides a good example for us to investigate the true impact of 
ownership variables on firm performance adjusting for earnings management effects. 
China servers as an interesting setting for the current study for the following reasons.  
First, institutional investors are believed to play an important role in western countries 
(Chung et al., 2002) while they basically hold a small amount of shares in Chinese 
listed firms and thus cannot play any important role in monitoring management. 
Therefore, controlling shareholders are believed to determine firm performance in 
many respects and hence we can focus on the impact of disproportional ownership in 
China’s listed firms.  
Secondly, because China’s listed firms have a highly concentrated ownership 
structure mostly dominating by a large shareholder, a key agency problem with a 
concentrated ownership structure is the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholders. This kind of agency issue is even more acute in china due to 
the specific ownership feature that controlling shareholders hold non-tradable and 
tradable shares while minority shareholders only own tradable shares. That is, in 
response to the divergence between non-tradable and tradable shares, the conflicting 
interests of controlling and minority shareholders have long been recognized as the 
source of substantial agency problems in China such as tunnelling. Thus, managers 
and directors of listed firms incline to manage earnings for controlling shareholders’ 
interests rather than their own entrenchment. 
Moreover, while shares are mostly widely held in US and the number of pyramidal 
structures is small, China’ listed firms are featured with highly-concentrated 
ownership, and family/or individual-controlled firms are mostly pyramidal structures. 
Maury (2006) suggests that family control mitigates the agency problem between 
shareholders and managers, but increases the conflicts of interests between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders when shareholder protection is weak and 
control is high, which is exactly the case of China. Thus, family/or individual-
controlled firms from China’s listed corporations based on a seven-year panel data set 
are used to investigate the impact of agency problem. 
A simple analysis on the relation between divergence and operating performance can 
be problematic if we do not consider earning management. As shown in Haw et al. 
(2004), earnings management is substantially increased by the divergence between 
control and cash flow rights by using data from 9 East Asian and 13 Western 
European countries. 
This study empirically examines the relation between disproportional ownership of 
controlling shareholders and firm performance after taking account of the effect of 
earnings management. We find that the separation of control and cash flow rights 
significantly increases earnings management only when the cash flow rights is highly 
concentrated. We also find that separation can restrain earnings management in firms 
with lower cash flow right concentration and hence boost true firm performance when 
the effect of earnings management is excluded. In terms of control-enhancing 
mechanisms (which deviates from one share-one vote) such as pyramids and cross-
holdings structure, we find that pyramidal structure dramatically increases earnings 
management and decreases true performance. Furthermore, in firms with lower cash 
flow concentration, pyramids are likely to weaken earnings management and thus 
enhance true corporate performance. Consequently, adjusting for the impact of 
earnings management substantially increases the measured importance of 
disproportional ownership structures of controlling shareholder on firm performance. 
The paper proceeds in five sections. The next section reviews the literature on 
ownership structure and earnings management. Section 3 introduces the data used in 
our study, presents the models to identify earnings management, and discusses the 
empirical approach. Section 4 presents empirical results and further robustness tests. 
A final section concludes. 
2. Separation of control and ownership and earnings management 
2.1 Earnings management 
It’s recognized for years in accounting and finance literature that managers use the 
latitude in accounting rules to manage accounting numbers and to serve their own or 
the firm’s interests in a wide variety of contexts (see, for example, Chen and Yuan, 
2004). In Healy and Wahlen (1999)’s review article, they conclude that the evidence 
is consistent with earnings management “to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. ” They 
also points out that if financial reports are used to convey managers’ information on 
their firms’ performance, managers must be allowed to exercise judgment in financial 
reporting. However, management’s discretion on judgment may lead to earnings 
management, under certain circumstances, even fraud.  
China’s stock market is under a weak legal context which provides little protection for 
minority shareholders.  There were increasingly outbreaks of corporate scandals in 
China’s listed firms during the early 2000s.  Likewise, the interests of minority 
shareholders were infringed by the controlling shareholders to a large extent.  
In prior literature, Klein (2002), Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) all find that 
earnings management can be restrained by well-designed corporate governance 
structures. For instance, Bedard et al. (2004) suggest that the proportion of 
independent directors on board of directors decreases the magnitude of earnings 
management. 
2.2 Ownership structure 
2.2.1 Separation of control and ownership 
La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) provided 
evidence that controlling shareholders of publicly listed firms in most countries have 
substantial control rights in excess of their cash flow rights. In Chinese listed firms, 
one major owner usually holds a substantial percentage of shareholdings. When 
controlling shareholders have control in excess of their cash flow rights, they incline 
to expropriate minority shareholders by seeking personal benefits. Supporting this 
view, Claessens et al. (2002) examined the impact of disproportional ownership on 
market value of equity across countries and found that cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholder is positively related to market-to-book ratio whilst the separation between 
control and cash flow rights is negatively related to market-to-book ratio. On the other 
hand, opposite evidence was provided, showing that omitted variable problems may 
affect the results. For example, La Porta et al. (2002) point out that the difference 
between control and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder is not significantly 
associated with Tobin’s q when country-wide indices of investor protection is 
involved in their models. Likewise, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) used fixed effects 
regression models from a panel of Swedish firms over 1991-1997 and did not find 
significant relationship between the difference in control and cash flow rights and 
firm value. However, it is not obvious whether the divergence affects operating 
performance. For example, Joh (2003) documented that a high difference between 
control and cash flow rights shows low firm profitability from 5,829 Korean firms 
during 1993-1997 while Bennedsen and Nielsen (2009) showed that separation 
reduces firm value but does not affect firm performance 
Moreover, in light of the specific non-tradable shares in China’s listed firms, large 
non-tradable shareholders typically have different interests from those of minority 
shareholders. In other words, the interests of non-tradable shareholders are not 
directly influenced by market share price due to the non-tradability of non-tradable 
shares. Consequently, concentrated ownership structure provides controlling 
shareholders potential to make company decisions and hence expropriate minority 
shareholders to their own benefits (Zou et al., 2008). 
In addition, ownership structure, more specifically, divergence between control and 
cash flow rights, affects the monitoring mechanisms a firm uses and hence influences 
the monitoring of earnings management activity. Evidence provided from Asian 
countries, Chen et al. (2010) employed data from Taiwan to show that high-growth 
firms with a high control-cash flow rights’ separation are more likely to engage in 
earnings management. Thus, we predict that the earnings management is high when 
the difference between control and cash flow rights is high and hence the true firm 
performance is low after adjusting the effects of earnings management. 
The magnitude of earnings management is affected both by the incentives and the 
opportunity of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that because private benefits of controlling shareholders 
are determined by its cash flow rights, cash flow rights can increase the controlling 
shareholders to pay out dividends (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000).  Thus, lower cash flow 
concentration weakens the controlling shareholders’ motivation for managing 
earnings since they have less cash flow incentives. Described above, when controlling 
shareholders’ control rights exceed their cash flow rights they are more likely to 
expropriate firm resources. More specifically, expropriation is more likely to occur 
when the difference between control and cash flow rights is large and when their 
position is secure (Joh, 2003). Combined together, we expect that controlling 
shareholders with large separation of control from cash flow rights decline to manage 
earnings when their position is unsecure, that is, when the cash flow concentration is 
low. 
2.2.2 Control-enhancing mechanisms 
Under “one share-one vote” there is no separation between control and cash flow 
rights. Therefore, disproportional ownership is referred to as the deviations from one 
share-one vote and hence as the use of mechanisms to separate control rights from 
cash flow rights in firms. Shareholders typically use several explicit mechanisms (i.e., 
control-enhancing mechanisms) to acquire control with less proportional economic 
interests in corporations, e.g., stock pyramids and cross-ownership. Controlling 
shareholders build pyramids by controlling firms “through a chain of companies”, 
which is another form of separating ownership and control (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Deviations from “one share-one vote” are found all over the world. Dual-class shares 
are proved to be rare in Eastern Asian countries while pyramids and cross-ownership 
structures are common (Claessens et al., 2000). Claessens et al (2002) further identify 
that most of the deviations from “one share-one vote” occur due to pyramidal control.  
Bennedsen and Nielsen (2007) examined the effects of disproportional ownership on 
firm value for a large sample in 14 Western European countries. They found that 
disproportional ownership caused by pyramids is the second most detrimental to firm 
value, following dual-class shares while other control-enhancing mechanisms do not 
have significant impact on firm value.  However, Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
investigated the effects of control-enhancing mechanisms including dual-class, voting 
agreements, pyramids and others by using US data. Their results suggest that control 
via pyramids do not affect firm value when control is measured as the separation from 
cash flow rights. 
Controlling shareholders have control rights in excess of their cash flow rights, 
mainly through the use of pyramids as well as participating in management. The 
power of these controlling shareholders is obviously not under supervision of other 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999).  Thus, we expect more expropriation of the 
minority shareholders and hence more earnings management in firms with pyramidal 
structures. However, lower cash flow concentration provides the controlling 
shareholders less incentives to manage earnings. For example, Nguyen and Xu (2010) 
found that within the sample of firms with dual class structure, the divergence 
between control and cash flow rights is negatively related with earnings management. 
Furthermore, dual-class structure creates a high difference between control and cash 
flow rights, which provides controlling shareholders a majority of control rights 
despite of their smaller residual claims. Moreover, the concentrated control rights can 
effectively reduce the likelihood of displacing management in a hostile takeover. Thus, 
managers will have less incentive to manage earnings when they do not need to worry 
about dismissal. In addition, the smaller cash flow rights will also reduce the possible 
private benefits from earnings management activities (Nguyen and Xu, 2010).  
Therefore, we also expect lower earnings management in firms with pyramidal 
structure and lower cash flow concentration. 
3. Data and models 
3.1 Sample  
Prior research finds that earnings management is more prevalent in poorly performing 
firms (e.g., Kothari et al., 2005) and when applied to firms with extreme corporate 
performance the standard models of discretionary accruals may not be reliable 
(Dechow et al., 1995). Here, following Cornett et al. (2008), we look at factors 
affecting earnings management in “normal” times when even good performing firms 
are influenced. That is, firms which received special treatment (ST)
2
 during the 
sample window are deleted. Thus, here the potential limitations of empirical 
discretionary accruals models can be ignored in this study because the sample of firms 
is free of financial distress. The study of Claessens et al. (2000) showed that the 
separation of cash-flow and control rights is most pronounced in family-controlled 
firms and small firms. Therefore, our research focuses on family-controlled and 
individual-controlled firms. 
Specifically, we constructed the dataset by merging the following two separate 
databases. First, we used accounting and other corporate governance data from the 
database developed by SinoFin Information Services
3
. Second, we assembled family-
controlled and individual-controlled data from China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology 
Company.  
We then exclude all financial firms
4
 because they are subject to fundamentally 
different regulatory regimes and internal governance structures. Due to data 
availability of cash flow rights and control rights of ultimate controller, the final 
                                                          
2
 CSRC released the Special Treatment (ST) regulation in 1998 that firms are specially treated if they 
make losses for two successive years.  
3
 Prior research has used SinoFin data set in their studies on China’s corporate governance, for example, 
see, Kato and Long, 2006. 
4
 Our industry classification follows Chen et al. (2006), listed Chinese firms are classified to 6 
industries: Finance, Utilities, Property and Construction, Conglomerates, Industrial and Manufactory, 
Commercial. 
sample consists of data on 5 non-financial industries during the time periods from 
2003 to 2009. 
We then delete observations without the availability of ownership structure, and 
accounting and financial data that this study needs. After these adjustments, we are 
left with a sample of 1775 firm-years over sample period 2003-2009. In our 
regressions, unlike the study of Cornett et al. (2008), the variables of the economic 
determinants of firm performance and earnings management are contemporary
5
. Table 
1 defines all the variables in our panel regression analysis. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
3.2 Discretionary accruals 
Dechow et al. (1995) claim the so-called “modified Jones (1991) model” as the model 
that provides the most power for detecting earnings management after they compare 
several models of discretionary accruals. Furthermore, Bartov et al. (2001) advocate 
the use of the modified Jones model when it is estimated cross-sectional using other 
firms in the same industry. Most models of discretionary accruals refer to 
discretionary accruals as the difference between actual and “normal” accruals, 
estimated by a regression formula. Firstly, the modified Jones model estimates normal 
accruals as a fraction of lagged assets from the following equation: 
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Where jtTA is total accruals for firm j in year t. Total accruals are calculated as 
earnings before interests and tax (EBIT)
6
. jtAssets is total assets for firm j in year t, 
jtSales is change in sales for firm j in year t, and jtPPE is property, plant, equipment 
for firm j in year t. 
In response to the research of Hribar and Collins (2002), compared with balance sheet, 
cash flow statement is preferred in computing total accruals when there are events 
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 As a sensitivity test, we rerun our analyses with lagged performance measurements and receive 
similar results. 
6
 EBIT is not required to be reported in income statement of China’s listed firms. Therefore, we employ 
operating income as proxy for EBIT. 
such as mergers and acquisitions which change balance sheet but not income 
statement. Following Cornett et al. (2008), we also compute total accruals as 
operating income (proxy for earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations) minus operating cash flows from continuing operations. Discretionary 
accruals as a portion of the book value of assets, %DA, are calculated as: 
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Where hats refer to as estimated values from regression Eq.1. Modified Jones model 
adds jtceivablesRe , which attempts to identify the amounts of aggressive 
recognition of questionable sales in sales changes, to the original Jones model. 
Following prior research on earnings management (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006), the value of discretionary accruals is normally used as a proxy for the 
magnitude of earnings management. We run fixed effects regressions in the sample 
period when the results of regressions will be discussed in detail in later section. 
To investigate the effects of ownership structure and other corporate governance 
factors on earnings management, we use the model as follows when we control the 
firm-specific characteristics: 
itLEVLASSETSLOSSLBOARDSIZEBOARDIND
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

87654
3210%
   (3) 
In Table 2, we present summary statistics concerning board composition, ownership 
structure, and firm-specific measures for family-controlled and individual-controlled 
firms. Like the studies of Claessens et al. (2000), we measured the ownership 
structure in terms of cash flow rights and control rights and hence computed 
separation, the divergence between control and cash flow rights. We therefore 
carefully followed the chain of ownership and used pyramiding structures and cross-
holdings to distinguish between control rights and cash flow rights. We defined the 
ultimate owner as the state with the largest control rights
7
 when summing direct and 
indirect ownership (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005).  
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 Following La Porta et al. (1999), I classify the largest shareholder with summing direct and indirect 
ownership as the ultimate owner. Take a look at the ownership structure in China’s listed firms, a 
singular ultimate owner mostly likely presents. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Panel A in Table 2 presents measures of cash-flow and control rights for the sample. 
Cash-flow rights (CASHRIGHT) is defined as the cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholder. Control rights (CONTROL) is defined as the voting rights of the largest 
shareholder. SEPARATION is defined as control rights less cash-flow rights, and 
DSEP is a dummy variable indicating whether the SEPARATION is greater than zero. 
Low cash-flow concentration (LCFC) is also a dummy variable that equals one when 
cash-flow rights is smaller than median cash-flow rights of full sample. Like 
ownership patterns in many other countries, ownership is concentrated and the largest 
shareholder mostly has control rights in excess of cash flow rights. Average cash flow 
rights in the sample is 23.1% while average control rights is 33.4%. The difference 
results in separation of 10.2% and 77.8% observations in our sample have control 
rights in excess of cash flow rights. In terms of different control-enhancing 
mechanisms in ownership disproportional sample, pyramids dominate 69% of full 
sample, compared to cross-holdings and other mechanisms.  
3.3 Firm performance 
In order to investigate the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance, we 
measure the reported firm performance as ROA, net income/assets, mostly used in 
prior research as measurement of firm performance. However, as a result of 
managers’ influence over accruals (for example, accounts receivable) as well as the 
treatment of amortization, ROA is likely to be manipulated by CEO (Dechow et al., 
1996). In order to measure true firm performance without management manipulation, 
we use the difference between ROA and %DA as proxy for unmanaged true 
performance. Therefore, exclusion of discretionary components makes this firm 
performance a more true performance compared with reported ROA, which might be 
cosmetic due to management discretion in accounting treatment. 
Two measurements of firm performance were reported in Table 2, Panel B: ROA and 
ROA-%DA. The average ROA based on reported earnings is 4.71%, and the mean 
performance measurement based on unmanaged true earnings (i.e., the effect of 
discretionary accruals on reported performance is removed) is 3.3%.  
Then we investigate whether industry adjustment makes any difference in firm 
performance. For each firm, we identify industry comparison firms as all firms listed 
on stock exchanges within the same industry
8
. Industry-adjusted performance is the 
firm’s performance in any year minus the average industry value for that year. We 
measure firm performance alternatively as reported ROA, net income/Assets, or true 
performance adjusted for discretionary accruals, (net income/Assets)-%DA. Industry 
adjusted performance is zero either by using net income/assets or by using (net 
income/assets)-%DA 
To compare the results between reported performance and true performance, we use 
following regression analyses when firm characteristics are controlled:                                                                                                                                       
itLEVLASSETSLOSSLBOARDSIZEBOARDIND
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                                                                                                                                     (4) 
Where NETINCOME/ASSETS is referred to as reported ROA in the paper and other 
variables are defined in Table 1. 
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                                                                                                                                      (5) 
Where (NETINCOME/ASSETS)-%DA is referred to as true performance excluding 
the effects of earnings management. 
3.4 Ownership structure  
Take Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. as an example for identifying cash flow rights, control 
rights and separation. The diagram of Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. in Fig. 1 illustrates 
the complexity of computing cash flow and control rights separately when ownership 
pyramids are present. Following the method in Claessens et at. (2000), voting rights 
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 Our industry classification follows Chen et al. (2006), listed Chinese firms are classified to 6 
industries: Finance, Utilities, Property and Construction, Conglomerates, Industrial and Manufactory, 
Commercial. 
were computed on the weakest link in the chain of shares owned by entities that are in 
turn controlled by the ultimate owner
9
. Additionally, if there are two parallel 
controlling chains connecting one firm and its controlling shareholders, the sum of the 
weakest links in each of the chain of shares was measured as control rights. We 
therefore calculated Huang Shaoliang’s control rights to be 14.57%, which equals the 
weakest link in the chain of control through Xinwang Co., Xufei Co., Xudao Co., 
Guangcaihong Co. and Xufei Group Co. In contrast, the cash flow rights of Huang 
Shaoliang in Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. was calculated to be 1.08%, which equals 
14.57%*(32%*69.97%+29%*51%)*50%*40%. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
To examine the effect of separation in control and cash flow rights further, we divide 
the sample according to whether controlling shareholders’ control rights exceed their 
cash flow or ownership rights. We then compare the individual components of 
separation, control and cash flow rights, and earnings management and firm 
performance across the two sub-samples. The results are showed in Table 3. Control 
rights exceeds cash flow rights in 1,425 firm-years and is equal to cash flow rights in 
350 firm-years. Controlling shareholders in the two sub-sample control around 34% 
and 30% of the firm’s voting rights, on average, respectively, but controlling 
shareholders in firms  with a separation only own 20% of the firm’s cash flow rights. 
Therefore, the separation appears to be the result of maintaining control while 
reducing cash flow rights. Moreover, 56.6% observations in firms with a separation 
are low cash flow concentrated while only 23.4% observations in firms without a 
separation are low cash flow concentrated. That is, separation in control and cash flow 
rights is more attributable to lower cash flow rights. In addition, reported ROA and 
earnings management are both lower for firms with a separation while true ROA 
shows no difference in two sub-samples. Taken together, these results suggest that 
controlling shareholders in firms with a separation are more likely to transfer 
resources out of firm to their own benefits and thus their true performance do not 
show much difference from their counterparts even though their reported ROA are 
much higher.   
(Insert Table 3 here) 
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 Following Claessens et at. (2000), We use 10% cut-off to identify the controlling shareholdings. 
Table 4 presents values according to the ranges of cash flow rights. We divide our 
sample to three different ranges when cash flow rights is less than or equal to 20%, 
greater than 20% and less than or equal to 20%, and greater than 30%. Cash flow 
rights is less than or equal to 20% for the majority of firms. For this group of firms, 
reported ROA is only a little smaller than the other two sub-samples but their true 
performance is the highest among three groups as well as the separation.  Taken 
together, the results in Table 3 and 4 suggest that stronger entrenchment effects of 
separation in control and cash flow rights do not exist in lower cash flow concentrated 
firms, on the contrary, the separation in lower cash flow concentrated firms even 
shows positive effects on true firm performance.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
3.5 Other variables 
We include several control variables in the regression analysis to account for firm-
specific characteristics that influence firm performance, for example, nature log of 
board size. The nature log can mitigate the difference in board size across firms and 
hence reduce heteroskedasticity. We also use nature log of assets for the same reason. 
To examine our hypotheses in terms of board characteristics, we collect data on the 
proportion of independent directors (BOARDIND), board size (LBOARDSIZE) and 
CEO/Chair duality (DUAL).  
Because free-riding problems among directors increase with board size (Jensen, 1993), 
smaller boards are expected to be more effective monitors than large boards. However, 
large boards are likely to be more effective monitors than small boards because they 
are harder controlled by management and thus can more effectively protect 
shareholders’ interests (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Most prior U.S. studies use two 
proxies for board independence, the proportion of outside directors, and a dummy 
variable showing whether the board has a majority of outside directors (Bedard et al, 
2004). However, the percentage of independent directors on the board of China’s 
listed firms is seldom greater than 50%, which is quite different from their U.S. 
counterparts, therefore we only use the proportion of independent directors as proxy 
for board independence. 
Firm size is measured by nature log of assets (LASSETS). Prior literature has shown 
that firm size is positively associated with firm performance significantly (for 
example, Cornett et al., 2008). Thus, we use LASSETS as our proxy for firm size. 
Leverage is also expected to play an important role in determining firm performance 
in terms of the potential agency costs of debt (Iyengar et al, 2005). We therefore 
include leverage rate (LEV) as control variable, which is measured as the book value 
of debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity. 
LOSS is used to measure a net loss for two consecutive years, which is considered to 
be one determinant variable for earnings management (Chen et al., 2010).  
Panel A of Table 2 represents the summary statistics of firm-specific characteristics. 
On average, leverage is 1.43, and the average proportion of independent directors on 
board is 59.7% when average number of directors serving on board is 6. 21.4% firms 
in our sample have the same person sitting on both CEO and chairman of board 
positions. Only 3% firms have net loss for prior two consecutive years. 
4. Empirical results 
We estimate two sets of regressions
10
. The first set investigates earnings management, 
and treats the value of discretionary accruals divided by assets as the dependent 
variable. The explanatory variables are corporate governance variables related to 
ownership structure and firm-specific control variables. The second set of regressions 
examines how firm performance relates to the same set of variables, both with and 
without adjustment for earnings management.  
4.1 Earnings management 
Table 5 shows fixed effects results of the earnings management proxied by 
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are computed from the modified Jones 
model, using Eq. 2 above. A fixed effects longitudinal regression model is used in our 
study when the standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
                                                          
10 In contrast to Cornett et al. (2008), our study is based on a panel data set, which 
mitigates a possible endogeneity problem by estimating fixed-effects models.  
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
As shown by Table 5, column 2 shows the results of Eq.3. The coefficient on 
SEPARATION is positively significantly associated with earning management, 
supporting our expectation that the higher the control-cash flow rights separation the 
higher the earnings management.  
To further investigate if cash flow concentration can affect the relationship between 
separation and earnings management, we divide the full sample to three different sub-
samples across different cash flow concentration (less than or equal to 20%, from 
20%-30%, and greater than 30%, respectively) in columns 3, 4, and 5. The magnitude 
of earnings management is only significantly negatively related with separation when 
cash flow rights is high (greater than 30%). Consistent with our prediction, when both 
the cash flow concentration and separation are high, the controlling shareholders will 
have incentive and opportunity of managing earnings.  In column 6, an interaction 
term LCFC*SEPARATION is added to test the additional effect of low cash flow 
concentration. The coefficients on LCFC*SEPARATION are -0.0037 at better than 
5% significance. The results also support our expectation that high divergence 
between control and cash flow rights can reduce earnings management when a firm 
has low concentrated cash flow rights. 
4.2 Firm performance 
A potential issue is the potential endogeneity issue between ownership structure and 
firm performance (Lins, 2003). By using Hausman test (1978), no serious endogeneity 
issue is found in our models. 
Table 6 and 7 indicate regression results of firm performance on ownership variables 
and firm-specific variables. We use reported firm performance (ROA), net 
income/assets, which can be referred to as unadjusted performance, as the dependent 
variable in Table 6. The reported performance reflects managers’ discretionary 
accounting treatments. Then we employ unmanaged (true) performance, which is 
computed as the difference between ROA and %DA, as the dependent variable in 
Table 7. The adjusted (true) performance is expected to exclude management 
discretions.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
In Table 6, separation and cash flow rights both significantly increase the reported 
performance in model 1, and LCFC*SEPARATION decreases the reported 
performance significantly while separation substantially increases it in model 5. Other 
ownership variables do not show any significant relationship with reported 
performance in all models.  
 (Insert Table 7 here) 
Table 7 represents the regression results by using the same model as Table 6, but the 
dependent variable is measured as the unmanaged (true) performance, ROA-%DA.  
Even though separation significantly increases earnings management in model 1, it 
has no significant relationship with true performance. In model 4, the coefficients on 
SEPARATION is -0.0078 at better than 1% significance due to the substantial 
increase in earnings management in Table 5. Likewise, after adjusting for the effects 
of earnings management, the coefficients on LCFC*SEPARATION are positively 
significantly related with true performance in model 5 while separation is negatively 
associated with true performance.  
4.3 Further tests  
In order to examine the effects of disproportional ownership structures, we divide our 
full sample to two sub-samples in Table 8, firms with pyramidal structures and firms 
with other control-enhancing mechanisms. We can see from Table 8 that separation is 
positively significantly associated with earnings management only in pyramids sub-
sample. Moreover, after removing the effects of earnings management, separation 
between control and cash flow rights reduces true performance significantly, which is 
consistent with our expectation that the negative effects of separation is likely to be 
stronger in firms with pyramidal structures. 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
To further examine the effects of cash flow rights concentration, we add a dummy 
variable PYRAMID, which equals one when the firm is pyramidal structured and zero 
otherwise, in our models. It can be seen from Table 9 that the coefficients on 
PYRAMID is 0.02, significantly related with earnings management, and hence 
significantly associated with true performance. Lower cash flow concentration is also 
significantly related with earnings management while marginally significantly related 
with true performance. Consistent with our prediction, the interaction item 
LCFC*PYRAMID reduces earnings management significantly and hence 
substantially increases the true performance, at better than 5% significance. 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
Prior studies used different measures of separation between control and cash flow 
rights, for example, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2007) employed a dummy indicating that 
control rights exceed cash flow rights. We also use separation dummy to rerun our 
models as robustness test in model 6 of Table 5, 6 and 7. The results are mostly 
consistent with our prior models.  
Like the research of Claessens et al. (2002), the issue of reverse causality is not a 
serious issue in our study because it is implausible that controlling shareholders 
quickly change the cash flow and control structures of their corporations in response 
to temporary change of firm performance.  
5. Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests that earnings management (proxied by discretionary accruals) 
responds dramatically to disproportional ownership.  Earnings management is higher 
when there is higher separation of control and cash flow rights. Earnings management 
also increases in response to the pyramidal structures. 
The results also suggest that the negative impact of separation on reported 
profitability may have been covered by the effect of earnings management. As the 
likely impact of earnings management is removed from profitability estimates, the 
measured importance of disproportional ownership structure increases. Therefore, the 
results suggest that a simple analysis on the relation between disproportional 
ownership structure and operating performance can be problematic if we do not 
consider earning management. 
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Table 1 Definitions of variables 
This table provides variable definitions used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Definition 
 Firm performance 
ROA  The average roa, which is calculated as net income divided 
by the book value of assets of the current year  
 Board characteristics 
BOARDIND  Proportion of independent directors on board 
LBOARDSIZE Natural log of the total number of directors serving on the 
board 
 Ownership structure 
SEPARATION Control  rights less cash flow rights 
CONTROL The proportion of votes controlled by the largest shareholder 
group 
CASHRIGHT The proportion of cash flow rights owned by the largest 
shareholder group 
DSEP A dummy variable that equals one when separation is 
positive and equals zero, otherwise 
LCFC A dummy variable that equals one when cash flow rights  is 
smaller than median cash flow rights of full sample and 
equals zero, otherwise 
PYRAMID A dummy variable that equals one when the control-
enhancing mechanisms are pyramids and equals zero, 
otherwise 
 Firm-level control variables 
LASSETS Natural log of the book value of assetst-1 
LEV  Leverage rate (debt/equity) 
DUAL  A dummy variable that equals one when the chairman and 
CEO positions are held by  the same person and equals zero,  
otherwise 
 
LOSS  A dummy variable that equals one when the net income is 
negative for the previous two years. 
INDUSTRY Dummy variables, 6 industries following Chen et al. (2006)  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on ownership and firm-specific variables   
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
25
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile 
BOARDIND 0.5973 0.5 0.2195 0.5 0.6667 
BOARDSIZE 5.7498 6 1.5298 5 6 
SEPARATION 10.238 9.1292 8.9275 1.3562 16.9197 
CONTROL 33.3822 29.85 14.2297 23.005 42.3 
CASHRIGHT 23.1323 20.6656 14.7523 11.4724 31.2211 
DSEP 0.778 1 0.4156 1 1 
LCFC 0.4963 0 0.5001 0 1 
PYRAMID 0.6901 1 0.4626 0 1 
LASSETS 20.944 20.8742 0.8457 20.3734 21.4507 
LEV 1.4328 0.9089 7.8998 0.4897 1.5544 
DUAL 0.214 0 0.4102 0 0 
LOSS 0.0302 0 0.1712 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on accruals and average performance   
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
25
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile 
Assets
accrualsaryDiscretionDA _%   
0.014 0.0032 0.0961 -0.0334 0.0525 
Abs(%DA) 0.0642 0.042 0.0729 0.0176 0.0853 
Performance measures      
Reported: 
ROA=net income/assets 
0.0471 0.037 0.0431 0.0187 0.0648 
True: 
ROA-%DA 
0.033 0.0364 0.0994 -0.011 0.0831 
Industry-adjusted performance      
Reported: 
ROA=net income/assets 
0.0000 -0.0082 0.0413 -0.0253 0.0165 
True: 
ROA-%DA 
-0.0000 0.0034 0.0983 -0.0437 0.0518 
Financial statement data of family-controlled and individual-controlled publicly listed 
Chinese firms are obtained from CSMAR database for each year, 2003-2009. 
Following Chen et al. (2006), for each firm, I identify 6 industries. Industry-adjusted 
performance is the firm’s net income in any year minus the average industry value for 
that year. I measure firm performance alternatively as reported ROA, net 
income/Assets, or performance adjusted for discretionary accruals as true firm 
performance, net income/Assets-%DA. Normal discretionary accruals are computed 
as Eq. (2). %DA (percentage discretionary accruals) are residuals between accrual 
accruals and normal accruals as a fraction of assets defined by the modified Jones 
model. Other variables definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison between family-controlled and individual-controlled firms with 
or without a divergence in control and cash flow rights 
Variables 
DSEP=1      
Mean    
(Stand. Dev.) 
N=1425 
DSEP=0      
Mean    
(Stand. Dev.) 
N=350 T-value for difference in means 
ROA 
0.0444 
(0.0427) 
0.058     
(0.043) -5.32*** 
%DA 
0.0127 
(0.2556) 
0.0223 
(0.0794) -1.8* 
ROA-%DA 
0.0324  
(0.1029) 
0.0357 
(0.0837) -0.55 
CASHRIGHT 
20.2861 
(13.738) 
30.4064 
(13.544) -12.38*** 
CONTROL 
33.8108 
(14.0385) 
30.4067 
(13.544) 4.09*** 
LCFC 
0.5656 
(0.4959) 
0.2343 
(0.4109) 12.26*** 
 
Measures of reported firm performance, earnings management, true performance, and 
ownership are presented separately for firms with or without a divergence in control and cash 
flow rights. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Reported firm performance, earnings management, true performance, and 
ownership across different ranges of cash flow rights. 
CASHRIGHT Observations 
ROA       
Mean    
(Stand. Dev.)  
%DA      
Mean    
(Stand. Dev.)  
ROA-%DA            
Mean                 
(Stand. Dev.)  
SEPARATION       
Mean        
(Stand. Dev.)  
0-20% 894 
0.0411 
(0.0427) 
0.0079    
(0.089) 
0.0332       
(0.093) 
13.8884       
(8.4985) 
20-30% 436 
0.0484 
(0.0433) 
0.0155 
(0.0892) 
0.0329      
(0.0903) 
8.232     
(9.2625) 
>30% 445 
0.0578  
(0.0415) 
0.0249   
(0.114) 
0.0329      
(0.1186) 
7.3427      
(7.8164) 
 
Averages of reported firm performance, earnings management, true firm performance, 
and separation are presented for sample firms grouped according to levels of cash 
flow rights. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Variable definitions are 
given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Regression analysis of earnings management on ownership variables  
Discretionary accruals computed by performance-matched modified Jones model over 2003-
2009. The dependent variable is discretionary accruals divided by assets, computed by Eq. 3.  
Multivariate Tests   
 (Dependent variable=%DA)   
Variables Model 1 
Model 2 (Cash 
flow 
rights<=20%)  
Model 3 
(20%<Cash 
flow 
rights<=30%) 
Model 4    
(Cash flow 
rights>30%) Model 5 Model 6 
              
SEPARATION 
0.0014**   
(0.0006) -0.0000  (0.001) 
-0.0008      
(0.0019) 
0.0078***      
(0.0026) 
0.0045***          
(0.0014)   
CASHRIGHT 
0.0006   
(0.0004) -0.0002  (0.0014) 
-0.0015      
(0.0028) 
-0.001      
(0.0016) 
0.0002    
(0.0006) 
-0.0001      
(0.0006) 
LCFC         
0.0169          
(0.0197) 
0.0144        
(0.0242) 
LCFC*SEPAR
ATION         
-0.0037**      
(0.0014)   
DSEP           
0.0415*        
(0.0223) 
DSEP*LCFC           
-0.0433*      
(0.0247) 
BOARDIND 
-0.0034   
(0.002) 0.0058 (0.0276) 
-0.0356    
(0.0482) 
0.0238 
(0.0601) 
-0.0054    
(0.0199) 
-0.0049          
(0.02) 
LBOARDSIZE 
-0.006    
(0.0195) -0.0143 (0.0257) 0.01   (0.046) 
-0.0004 
(0.0594) 
-0.0055 
(0.0194) 
-0.0068       
(0.0195) 
DUAL 
0.008     
(0.0102) -0.002  (0.0144) 
0.0091       
(0.0237) 
0.02       
(0.0308) 
0.0079       
(0.0102) 
0.0083       
(0.0102) 
LEV 
-0.0098**    
(0.005) 
-0.0139**  
(0.0065) 
-0.0183    
(0.0162) 
-0.0003    
(0.0162) 
-0.009*     
(0.005) 
-0.009*        
(0.0049) 
LASSETS 
0.0068   
(0.0074) -0.0017 (0.012) 
-0.0024    
(0.0189) 
-0.0186 
(0.0188) 
0.0043   
(0.0074) 
0.0059        
(0.0074) 
LOSS 
0.0944     
(0.134) - - - 
0.0849     
(0.134) 
0.1085        
(0.1634) 
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable 
definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Determinants of reported performance (ROA) in terms of ownership 
variables. 
Reported firm performance (ROA), net income/assets, which can be referred to as 
unadjusted performance, is used as the dependent variable. 
Multivariate Tests   
 (Dependent variable=ROA)   
Variables Model 1 
Model 2 (Cash 
flow 
rights<=20%)  
Model 3 
(20%<Cash flow 
rights<=30%) 
Model 4    
(Cash flow 
rights>30%) Model 5 Model 6 
              
SEPARATION 
0.0005**   
(0.0002) 
0.0005  
(0.0004) 
0.0000      
(0.0007) 
-0.0000      
(0.0006) 
0.0015***          
(0.0005)   
CASHRIGHT 
0.0003**   
(0.0001) 
-0.0004  
(0.0005) 
-0.0004      
(0.001) 
-0.0007*      
(0.0004) 
0.0001    
(0.0002) 
0.0001        
(0.0002) 
LCFC         
0.0042          
(0.0067) 
-0.0052      
(0.0082) 
LCFC*SEPARATION         
-0.0012**      
(0.0005)   
DSEP           
0.0105        
(0.0075) 
DSEP*LCFC           
-0.0016      
(0.0084) 
BOARDIND 
0.012*       
(0.0067) 
0.0165*    
(0.01) 0.028*    (0.0169) 
-0.0056    
(0.0134) 
0.0113*    
(0.0067) 
0.0116*           
(0.0067) 
LBOARDSIZE 
-0.0001    
(0.0066) 
0.0021 
(0.0094) 
-0.0072    
(0.0161) 
-0.0272** 
(0.0132) 
0.0000   
(0.0066) 
0.0000        
(0.0066) 
DUAL 
0.0017     
(0.0035) 
0.0008  
(0.0053) 
-0.0037    
(0.0083) 
-0.0045    
(0.0068) 
0.0017       
(0.0034) 
0.0018       
(0.0035) 
LEV 
-0.0121***    
(0.0017) 
-0.0097***  
(0.0023) 
-0.0225***    
(0.0057) 
-0.0074**    
(0.0036) 
-0.0118***     
(0.0017) 
-0.0118***        
(0.0017) 
LASSETS 
0.0035   
(0.0025) 
0.0021  
(0.0044) 0.0028    (0.0066) 
-0.0057 
(0.0042) 
0.0026   
(0.0025) 
0.0033        
(0.0025) 
LOSS 
-0.0541    
(0.0453) - - - 
-0.0566 
(0.0453) 
-0.0509       
(0.0552) 
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable 
definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Determinants of true firm performance (PERF) in terms of ownership 
variables. 
The dependent variable is measured as the true performance, net income/assets-%DA. 
Multivariate Tests   
 (Dependent variable=ROA-%DA)   
Variables Model 1 
Model 2 (Cash 
flow 
rights<=20%)  
Model 3 
(20%<Cash 
flow 
rights<=30%) 
Model 4    
(Cash flow 
rights>30%) Model 5 Model 6 
              
SEPARATION 
-0.001    
(0.0006) 0.0006  (0.001) 
0.0008      
(0.0019) 
-0.0078***      
(0.0026) 
-0.003**   
(0.0013)   
CASHRIGHT 
-0.0003  
(0.0004) 
-0.0002  
(0.0014) 
0.0011      
(0.0028) 
0.0003      
(0.0016) 
-0.0000  
(0.0006) 
0.0002        
(0.0006) 
LCFC         
-0.0127      
(0.0198) 
-0.0196      
(0.0242) 
LCFC*SEPARATION         
0.0025*     
(0.0014)   
DSEP           
-0.031        
(0.0223) 
DSEP*LCFC           
0.0417*        
(0.0247) 
BOARDIND 
0.0154       
(0.02) 
0.0108    
(0.0277) 
0.0637    
(0.0468) 
-0.0294    
(0.0597) 
0.0167      
(0.02) 
0.0165           
(0.02) 
LBOARDSIZE 
0.0059    
(0.0195) 0.0164 (0.0259) 
-0.0171    
(0.0447) 
-0.0268 
(0.059) 
0.0055   
(0.0195) 
0.0069        
(0.0195) 
DUAL 
-0.0063 
(0.0102) 
0.0028  
(0.0145) 
-0.0128    
(0.023) 
-0.0245    
(0.0306) 
-0.0062      
(0.0102) 
-0.0065      
(0.0102) 
LEV 
-0.0023    
(0.005) 
0.0043  
(0.0065) 
-0.0042    
(0.0157) 
-0.0072    
(0.0161) 
-0.0028     
(0.005) 
-0.0028        
(0.0049) 
LASSETS 
-0.0033 
(0.0074) 0.0038  (0.012) 
0.0052    
(0.0184) 
0.0129 
(0.0187) 
-0.0017     
(0.0075) 
-0.0025       
(0.0074) 
LOSS 
-0.1485    
(0.1341) - - - 
-0.1415 
(0.1344) 
-0.1594      
(0.1345) 
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable 
definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Determinants of reported firm performance, earnings management, and true 
firm performance (PERF) in terms of control-enhancing mechanisms: pyramids and 
other ownership disproportional. 
Control-enhancing mechanisms 
  PYRAMIDS OTHERS 
Variables 
Dependent 
variable=net 
income/assets %DA 
Dependent 
variable=ROA-
%DA 
Dependent 
variable=net 
income/assets %DA 
Dependent 
variable=ROA-
%DA 
              
SEPARATION 
0.0003    
(0.0003) 
0.00019** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0015*  
(0.0008) 
0.0000      
(0.0006) 
0.0011  
(0.0004) 
-0.0011       
(0.0014) 
CASHRIGHT 
0.0005***   
(0.0002) 
0.0009  
(0.0006) 
-0.0005    
(0.0006) 
-0.0000    
(0.0003) 
-0.0002  
(0.0008) 
0.0002        
(0.0008) 
BOARDIND 
0.0122       
(0.0076) 
0.0103    
(0.0246) 
0.0019    
(0.0246) 
-0.001    
(0.0147) 
-0.0377    
(0.0362) 
0.0368           
(0.036) 
LBOARDSIZE 
0.0086    
(0.0073) 
-0.0021    
(0.0236) 
0.0108    
(0.0236) 
-0.0289* 
(0.0151) 
-0.0201    
(0.0371) 
-0.0087        
(0.037) 
DUAL 
-0.0031 
(0.0041) 
0.0029  
(0.0131) 
-0.006    
(0.0131) 
0.0152**    
(0.0073) 
0.0076      
(0.0179) 
0.0076        
(0.0179) 
LEV 
-0.0113***    
(0.0017) 
-0.0101*    
(0.0056) 
-0.0012    
(0.0056) 
-0.014**     
(0.0057) 
-0.0111     
(0.014) 
-0.0028        
(0.0139) 
LASSETS 
0.0019   
(0.0029) 
0.0034  
(0.0092) 
-0.0015    
(0.0092) 
0.0035 
(0.0059) 
0.0309**     
(0.0145) 
-0.0274*       
(0.0145) 
LOSS 
-0.0533    
(0.0427) 
0.0987  
(0.1375) 
-0.152    
(0.1377) - 
-0.1415 
(0.1344) 
-0.1594      
(0.1345) 
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable 
definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Determinants of reported firm performance, earnings management, and true 
firm performance (PERF) in terms of control-enhancing mechanisms, pyramid 
dummy. 
Variables 
Dependent 
variable=net 
income/assets %DA 
Dependent 
variable=ROA-%DA 
        
CASHRIGHT 
0.0002    
(0.0001) 
0.0006*    
(0.0003) 
-0.0003         
(0.0003) 
PYRAMID 
-0.0059    
(0.0044) 
0.0231**    
(0.0095) 
-0.0277***         
(0.0104) 
LCFC 
-0.006    
(0.0049) 
0.0222**    
(0.011) 
-0.0225*         
(0.0119) 
PYRAMID*LCFC 
-0.0016   
(0.0051) 
-0.032***    
(0.0113) 
0.026**      
(0.0122) 
BOARDIND 
0.0125**   
(0.0056) 
-0.0031  
(0.0039) 
0.0157        
(0.0146) 
LBOARDSIZE 
-0.0017  
(0.0049) 
-0.0027  
(0.0108) 
0.0005         
(0.0118) 
DUAL 
0.0016   
(0.0026) 
0.0004   
(0.0059) 
-0.0011        
(0.0063) 
LEV 
-0.0131***  
(0.0012) 
-0.0022  
(0.0026) 
-0.0111***    
(0.0028) 
LASSETS 
0.0017   
(0.0015) 
0.0034   
(0.0029) 
-0.0014       
(0.0033) 
LOSS 
-0.0618*    
(0.0322) 
-0.0126    
(0.096) 
-0.0647        
(0.0986) 
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable 
definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. example.   
Source: Data obtained from company prospectuses. The arrow indicates the direction of 
control. 
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